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NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT
DECISIONS.
In the February number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
in a note to Railway Co. v. Spencer, the English
cases of Rayner v. Preston, and- Castellain v. Preston, were
cited and discussed. I think that Raynor v. Preston, is good
law in New York, and ought to be good law everywhere.
Castellain v. Preston, I am not very well satisfied with. In
the first place, its conclusion is not demonstrated to be consistent with the doctrine of indemnity. I{ proceeds upon the
notion that the value of the property at the time of the fire,
must be the same as its value at the time of the execution of
the executory contract to sell. This may not have been so.
There was in that case a two year period within which to.
exercise option to complete sale. But a more serious objection
is this. An executory contract to sell a house and lot in
future is not a present sale, and, until the time comes for
closing title, the vendor, who is still the owner, would seem
to have the right to reap the advantage of pending contracts.
with third parties relating to his property. When the time for
closing title arrives, the vendee is entitled to receive substantially what he has contracted for. If the house has meanwhile burned down, or has been substantially injured or
destroyed by fire, it does not seem to me that the vendee is .
legally obligated to take the property undel the usual executory
contract of sale.
And this position is not without warrant of authority, and
has been expressly held in New York. Listman v. Hickey,
N. Y. Law Journal, p. 1249, Feb. 20, 1892; Smith v.
McCluskey, 45 Barb. 61o; Goldman v. Rosenberg, 116 N.
Y. 7 8; Smyth v. Sturges, io8 N. Y. 492. If the vendee
chooses to complete the purchase, he does-so because he considers the property still worth the purchase price. If the
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vendor cannot compel a purchase, there is no legal right in
his favor to form a basis for subrogation in favor of the insurance company. Moreover, the rule in Castellain v. Preston,
would not work well in practice. To compel the parties to a
future executory contract to complete as matter of legal
obligation when both of them prefer to cancel before the time
for closing would be manifestly inconvenient. But if the law
permitted them to cancel their executory contract, they would,
by consent, do this upon the occurrence of the fire, in order to
compel the insurers to pay the loss, provided, Castellain v.
Preston, were good law. After cancelling the subsisting contract of sale, a new contract of the same tenor and effect might
immediately be substituted under which it could not be claimed
that the insurance company would have any right of subrogation to the purchase price.
The insurance contract is, in its terms, an agreement to pay
to the vendor the cash value of his property destroyed. The.
starting point and presumption should be, that the contract is
to be enforced according to its express terms unless a clear
consideration of public policy intervenes, and where the assured
has respected the doctrine of the necessity of an insurable
interest at the time of the issuance of the policy, and also
during its entire life it is hardly worth while to press the doctrine of indemnity any further. According to Castellain v.
Preston, the insurers may receive premiums for nothing, though
no condition of the contract has been violated by the insured;
and this result is in itself inequitable.
The strict doctrine of indemnity has for convenience been
abandoned in the law of life insurance on this account. Nor
is it uniformly applied in the law of fire insurance in accordance with the rigid rules laid down in Castellain v. Preston.
In proof of this, many cases might be cited from the English
and American reports: Blackstone v. Alemahnia Ins. Co., 56
N. Y. 104; Mut. Safety Ins. Co. v. Hone, 2 Comst. (N. Y.)
235; Collingridge '. Royal Exchange Ins. Co., 3 Q. B. D.
173 ; Seymour v. Vernon, 21 L. J. Ch. 433 ; Burnardv. Rodocanachi, 7 App. Cas. 333, 339.
In fact, in Castellain v. Preston, the learned justices seem to
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be avowedly struggling throughout their opinions with the
many legal obstacles with which they have to contend.
A contract to sell in future is not a sale within the meaning
of the policy: Browning v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 5o8;
Ayres v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 176; Hill v. Cumberland Valley M. P. Co., 59 Penn. St. 474And until title passes, it is convenient to consider the vendor's relations to his insurance contracts undisturbed.
GEORGE RICHARDS,

New York, Fibruary i3, 1894.

CASES ON WILLS.

As cosmopolitain habits increase in popularity, the decisions
upon the probate of foreign, or partially foreign wills and
codicils, become of greater importance, particularly where the
will of the testator is contained in more than one document.
The question of incorporations in the probate of separate
documents, has frequently troubled the courts, especially the
probate of separate and distinct wills disposing of property in
a different country from that in which the general will of the
testator is offered for probate. The Probate Division of the
High Court of Justice. in England, were recently confronted
with a most peculiar state of facts, In re Goods of Tampui
[1894] P. 39. Testator domiciled in England, left a will with
two codicils, disposing of his property in England and Russia,
and also two other instruments, one a will, revoking all previous dispositions so far as they related to his real property in
Russia, and appointing separate executofs of that property..
All the executors and trustees united in applying for probate
in England of the five instruments. The Russian will was not
executed in accordance with Russian law, and it was hoped
that, if admitted in England, the domicile of 'the testator, the
probate might be recognized in Russia as covering the realty.
The court refused to allow the will relating to the Russian real
propetty to be included in the probate, since that would be the
same as saying that a will dealing only with English personalty,
and a will dealing only with English realty, ought both to be
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admitted to probate, because, forming together a disposition, of
the whole property of the testator. No case, it was asserted,
could be cited to that effect. The point, however, was regarded
as important, and an appeal probable. In the cases where the
courts have not insisted upon the probate of all the separate
testamentary papers, they have done so as a concession to the
convenience of the parties in interest: In the Goods of Astor,
I P. D. I 5o. A concession in the case of the Goods of Tampui,
would have been a matter of great practical convenience, certainly it has been the invariable custom to require some memorandum to be attached to the general will probated of the
document relating to the foreign goods, so that any one looking at the probate may be at once apprised of the existence of
such other paper.
The well established rule in Pennsylvania that no testator is
presumed to die intestate as to any part of his property, if the
words of the will can be construed to carry the whole, is
forcibly illustrated and confirmed in Reimer's Estate, 28
Atlantic, I86. *The clause in dispute contained the words, "I
give to my brother Andrew all my household goods, books,
clothing, furniture, etc., that he may desire. The balance o
the personal effects to be divided among the children of my
sister." The Orphans' Court decided that the words "balance
of personal effects," referred only to the goods mentioned in
the bequest to Andrew, and did not include a large residue o
personal property, consisting of cash and securities. This
decision the Supreme Court has reversed, giving the clause
the broadest possible construction, and the word, ",effects," the
widest possible meaning, holding in fact, that the sentence is
residuary in its character. Justice Dean, in dissenting, took
the view that the words, personal effects, were restricted by the
context, and that the intentions of the deceased could be
plainly ascertained.
In cases of the construction of ambiguous phrases in wills,
arguments from precedents are nearly useless, for no two cases
are alike. The maxim that no testator is presumed to die
intestate as to a part of his goods, if the words will carry the
whole is so often and so triumphantly quoted in recent deci-
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sions, that it may be regarded as a ready and useful Deus er
machina for relieving a distracted bench.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, has had occasion, in the recently reported In re Barber's Estate,27 Atlantic,
973, to consider the ever recurring question of testamentary
capacity and the exhaustive character of the opinion delivered
will, itis to be hoped, not only end the discussion inthat state,
but also be of service in other jurisdictions. The court had
to dispose of a wordy and ponderous charge to the jury, containing statements to the effect that the burden of proof lies
in every case, and remains throughout the trial upon the proponents of the will. That the burden upon the proponents is
not that of proof by a fair preponderance, but by such evidence
as brings certainty to the minds of the jury. And that to
defeat a will on the ground that it is the product of an insane
delusion, the jury should be satisfied by a -reponderance of
evidence of the existence and effect of such a delusion. These
statements were certainly calculated to confuse a jury. The
Supreme Court, however, reviews the whole subject of the
burden of proof in cases involving testamentary capacity, finding an irreconciliable conflict of views and opinions. The
present tendency is-to hold that, on formal proof of capacity
by the attesting witnesses, the burden of proof upon the proponents has been discharged, and thereafter rests upon the
party alleging incapacity. If the opinions of the attesting
witnesses are favorable, the court concludes, the contestant
will go forward with affirmative evidence of insanity, and proponent will rebut, there being always a presumpltion in favor of
sanity, which must be counterbalanced by- a pxeponderance of
evidence. It is hardly necessary to discuss the deplorable
situation of the proponent, should the opinions of the attesting witnesses prove unfavorable. The interesting topics touched
upon in this case are hypothetical questions, expert testimony
and the admissibility of letters addressed to testator and found
among his papers.

W. H.

LOYD.
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SOME RECENT CASES

ON RAILROAD

LEASES.

Whatever may be the advantages of railroad consolidation
from an economic point of view the tendency of legislation
and judicial decision is to limit it as far as practicable. "The
object, of course, is to prevent the growth of monopolies, by
hindering the formation of systems of railroads which will
virtually control vast regions of country to the exclusion of all
competition. There are numerous constitutional and statutory
provisions which forbid the consolidation of parallel and competing lines; and the courts are always ready to scrutinize
closely any attempt at consolidation where there is no legislative authority for it. The rule seems to be that, where a railroad company is granted a franchise, intended ift a
large measure to be exercised for the public good, the due
performance of its franchise being the consideration of the
public grant, any contract which disables the corporation from
performing those functions, without the consent of the state,
and tranfers to others the rights and powers conferred by the
charter, relieves the grantees of the burden which the charter
imposes, is a violation of the contract with the state, and is
void as against public policy. This rule was applied in the
very recent case of Earle v. Seattle, L. S. & E. Ry. Co., 56
Fed. Rep. 909 (June, 1 9 3 ), where a railroad company organized under the laws of Washington, attempted to consolidate
with another company by a traffic agreement, which involved
the surrender of the entire control and management of its
affairs for its legal lifetime. Under the laws of Washington a
railroad company has no authority to transfer its franchise
except by sale and conveyance and lease in a manner prescribed by the statute. The court held that the traffic agreement was involved and should be set at the suit of the
minority of the stockholders.
In Stockton, Attorney General v. Central R. R., of New
Jersey, 24 Ati. Rep'. 964 (1892), the court approved the
doctrine that even where a railroad company was given the
power to lease, that power impliedly, from the character of
railroad corporations as quasi public bodies, was limited to

238

NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.

leases designed for the public welfare, and did not warrant a
lease in furtherance of a scheme to prevent competition, and
create a monopoly. The decision of the case did not turn
upon this proposition, but the lease complained of was set
aside because it had been made to a foreign corporation, for
which there was not only no legislative authority but an actual
legislative prohibition.
In Oregon, where there is no statute which authorizes
either expressly or by implication a railroad lease, such lease
has been held absolutely void: Oregon Ry. & Nair. Co. v.
Oregonian Ry. Co., 145 U. S. 52.
See also on this subject
Hamilton v. Savannah F. & W..Ry. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 412.
Statutory prohibition against leases of competing lines are
strictly construed against companies which attempt to evade
them. Thus in Hafer v. Cincinnati H. & D. R. Co., 29
Wkly. Law Bul. (Ohio) 68 (1892), it was held that a railroad
was competing within the meaning of the Ohio statute,
though the competing points were reached by trackage
arrangements with other lines. In Hamilton v. Savannah, F.
& W. Ry. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 412, it was held that the purchase of one railroad by another was illegal under the constitutional provision which forbade one corporation to make any
contract with another tending to defeat or lessen competition in
their respective business. If a railroad company is authorized
to lease another railroad connected with it, the authority must
be restricted to railroads that are finished: Pittsburg & Connelsville R. R. v. Bedford & Bridgeport R. R., 32 P. F. Smith
(Pa.), 104.
Legislative authority to make a traffic arrangement with
another railroad does not imply a power' to lease. In St.
Louis V. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. R. R. Co.,
12 S. Ct. 953 (1892), it appeared that an Indiana statute,
authorized any railroad company of Indiana "to intersect,
form and unite" with any railroad of an adjourning state constructed to the state line, and "to make such contracts and
agreements with any such road
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for the transportation

of freight and passengers, or for the use of its road, as to the
board of directors may seem proper. The court held that this
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statute did not authorize one railroad corporation to lease its
road to another.
In Thomas v. West Jersey R. R., 101 U. S. 71, it was held
that, where a railroad company is authorized to make contracts with other corporations and individuals for transporting
or conveying passengers and merchandise, it cannot make a
lease to three individuals by which all its rights and duties are
transferred to them for twenty years.
ALBERT

B.

WEIMER.

